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The Dialectic of Hegel and Nishida
How to Deal with Modernity
This essay discerns in Nishida’s later work lines of thought that could con-
stitute a project of overcoming modernity, and explores its potentials and 
problems. My guiding thread is a comparison between Nishida’s philoso-
phy and that of Hegel, who, according to Habermas, first developed a clear 
concept of modernity through his idea of dialectic. Nishida perceived the 
Hegelian dialectic as conceptually endorsing Western colonialism, one of 
the ill effects of modernity. I argue Nishida’s philosophy, which puts for-
ward another dialectic based on absolute nothingness, had the potential 
to undermine the justification of colonialism and propose a worldview in 
which different peoples could coexist free from subjugation. I also argue 
that Nishida nevertheless ruined this very potential by essentializing his 
own nation as the privileged embodiment of absolute nothingness. This 
essay thus emphasizes the necessity to tackle ethnocentrism that lurks in 
philosophical thinking and sabotages its creativity. 
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In contrast to the conception of Western modernity, which has often been taken as the sole form of modernity, postcolonial discourses offer 
alternative perceptions that argue modernity can have different origins or 
take different shapes in diverse locations. As such, these discourses view 
the modernization of non-Western regions not as merely an imitation of 
Western modernity or subjugation to Western hegemony, but as the prod-
uct of their own powers and possibilities. Thus, postcolonial discourses do 
not speak of one “modernity,” but rather consider a plurality of “moder-
nities.” While accepting the strength of this position, however, Timothy 
Mitchell notes its weakness as well: “the language of alternative moderni-
ties can imply an almost infinite play of possibilities, with no rigorous sense 
of what, if anything, gives imperial modernity its phenomenal power of 
replication and expansion.”1 Even though there can be infinite forms of 
modernity, they may sometimes reproduce imperial power relations similar 
to those of Western modernity. Nevertheless, the alleged “alternativeness” 
of non-Western modernities can prevent investigations into such relations 
inherent in these modernities. In this case, they would no longer be “alter-
native,” as they conserve within themselves the negative legacies of Western 
imperial modernity. 
A case in point is a symposium titled “Overcoming Modernity,” orga-
nized by prominent Japanese intellectuals in 1942, soon after the beginning 
of the Asia-Pacific War. From the Meiji period onward, Japan had embarked 
on modernization by importing Western culture; modernization, here, was 
equal to Westernization. Therefore, when it launched the war against West-
ern countries, Japan’s urgent task, as perceived by the Japanese people, was not 
only to surpass the West, but also to overcome the modernity equated with 
1. Mitchell 2000, xii. 
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the West. The symposium’s slogan, “Overcoming Modernity,” effectively 
outlined the public opinion of the country at the time. Many Japanese intel-
lectuals also took this slogan, which epitomized the reasons for Japan’s fight 
against Western imperialism, as a justification for Japan’s colonial aggression 
in Asia. Harry Harootunian famously notes that the arguments of this sym-
posium were in fact “overcome by modernity,” as they practically reaffirmed 
the ideologies of Western modernity that they had professed to surmount. 
While the participants of the symposium included four members of the 
Kyoto School, the school’s founder, Nishida Kitarō, did not take part. Still, 
historical situations cast a shadow upon his thought: several years before the 
symposium, in his 1937 lecture, “The Scholarly Method,” he described the 
task of Japanese scholars as, “creat[ing] a new global culture from Eastern 
cultural backgrounds that have fostered us for thousands of years,”2 while 
working in Western disciplines in which Eurocentric ways of thinking 
still dominated. Despite his absence during the 1942 symposium, it can be 
argued that Nishida was also engaged in a philosophical project to over-
come Western modernity. 
Thus, the objective of this essay is to explore Nishida’s work on moder-
nity and his philosophies on how Japan could overcome it. My guiding 
thread is a comparison between his philosophy and that of Hegel, who, 
according to Habermas, was “the first philosopher to develop a clear con-
cept of modernity.”3 My strategy is to analyze Nishida’s confrontation with 
Hegelianism, and discern the lines of thought Nishida put forward to tackle 
Western modernity and its ill effects. As such, my attempt is a retrospective 
interpretation. Although this approach cannot completely avoid the projec-
tion of external schema, it can enable one to cast fresh light upon the poten-
tials buried in a past philosophy. At the same time, if we look at its potential, 
we should turn our eyes to its limits as well. By considering both its strengths 
and limitations, this essay will reveal how Nishida’s philosophy proves that, 
although they may appeal to the postcolonial vision of numerous “moderni-
ties,” non-Westerners’ challenges to Western modernity do not necessarily 
guarantee their success in overcoming it. My point is not that non-Western 
modernities are doomed to imitate and submit to Western modernity; 
2. nkz 7: 385. Unless otherwise indicates, translations of Japanese texts are my own.
3. Habermas 1987, 4. 
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instead, I argue that closer attention needs to be paid to whether different 
modernities can really be considered “alternative.” Otherwise, much like 
“overcoming modernity,” the term “alternative modernities” risks becoming 
a mere slogan—a deceptive slogan that distracts our eyes from the persis-
tence of the same old problems. 
To clarify what is at issue here and why it should be dealt with, this essay 
begins by addressing the formulation of modernity Habermas finds in the 
Hegelian dialectic. Based on this interpretation, I will explicate the ill effects 
of modernity in reference to the critical insights into modernity offered by 
contemporary scholars, Peter Osborne and James Tully. I will then discuss 
Nishida’s criticisms of the Hegelian dialectic and worldview based on his 
evaluations of these ill effects of modernity. I will thus demonstrate how 
Nishida’s project to overcome modernity is present in his work on sur-
mounting the defects he saw in Hegelianism. Subsequently, I will examine 
a further dialectic and worldview Nishida presented, which he intended 
to be free from the defects of Hegelianism he perceived, and thus present 
the potential of his project to overcome modernity. Finally, I will critically 
examine his work in terms of its consistency and show that Nishida’s reason-
ing ended up contradicting the goals of his project, and ruined its potential 
of “overcoming modernity.” 
Modernity in its emancipatory  
and oppressive aspects
According to Habermas, the essence of the historical conscious-
ness of modernity is the tendency to distinguish itself as the most recent 
stage of advancement in relation to the past, or even from the modern.4 
Modernity thus understood consists of the distinct differentiating move-
ment from old to new. However, since the most recent quickly becomes less 
new over time, for modernity to sustain itself, it must continue to differenti-
ate itself from itself. This generates what Habermas refers to as “a continual 
renewal.”5 This untiring urge towards incessant progress is for Habermas the 
principle of modernity. 
4. Ibid., 6. 
5. Ibid., 7. 
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Habermas remarks that if Hegel could conceptualize the principle of 
modernity as such, it is by his concept of “an absolute that… retains as uncon-
ditional only the infinite processing of the relation-to-self that swallows up 
everything finite within itself.”6 The absolute mentioned here is absolute 
spirit as Hegel conceives of it, namely, the substance that posits itself as the 
subject, while at once making its object diverge from it. Hegel describes this 
substance as “the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the 
negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis.” That is, absolute 
spirit, after positing itself as the subject and making its object diverge from 
it, negates the opposition between the two by cognizing the object. Hegel 
alludes to the “self-restoring sameness”7 of this spirit, by which he means 
absolute spirit, through this synthesis, restores its sameness as the subject, 
while enriching itself by incorporating the object. Habermas describes this 
movement of spirit as the “processing of the relation-to-self,” or, more pre-
cisely, the relating of itself to itself through the mediation of its other that is 
to be integrated into the self. The logic operative in this movement, posing 
the opposites and resolving their contradiction through their synthesis, is 
the so-called “dialectic.” Absolute spirit infinitely repeats this movement so 
that it creates all the things that constitute the entire world and its history, 
and sees itself realized in them. Habermas therefore describes “the infinite 
processing of the relation-to-self ” as “swallow[ing] up everything finite 
within itself.” 
Spirit’s self-cognition thus carried out is not only the realization of ratio-
nality, but also that of freedom, in the actual world. While the spirit in devel-
oping its self-cognition repeats bifurcation and integration, humans having 
different positions face and surmount their oppositions or conflicts, so as to 
attain greater truth and freedom. Hegel believed the dialectical movement 
of the spirit that goes towards this goal moves the world and carries history 
forward: “World history is the necessary development, out of the Notion 
of spirit’s freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self-con-
sciousness and freedom of spirit. This development is the interpretation and 
realization of the universal spirit.”8 Although the phrase that world history 
6. Ibid., 36. 
7. Hegel 1977, 10.
8. Hegel 1952, 216; translation modified with reference to hw 7: 504. For consistency in the 
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develops “out of the Notion of spirit’s freedom” may sound odd, it has its 
reason in Hegel’s view: for him, it is not that an object comes first and then is 
grasped by the Notion. Instead, it is the Notion that precedes the object and 
makes it emerge so it is recognized by the Notion, and thus accomplishes 
it. Hegel writes: “The Notion is what truly comes first, and things are what 
they are through the activity of the Notion that dwells in them and reveals 
itself in them.”9 This view, which seemingly turns things upside-down, 
becomes understandable if we take into account Hegel’s equation between 
the Notion and absolute spirit itself: “It is essentially only spirit that can 
comprehend the Notion as Notion; for this is not merely the property of 
spirit but spirit’s pure self.”10 By positing its objects, absolute spirit creates 
everything; by cognizing them, it identifies them with itself. While thus 
continually diverging from and returning to itself, absolute spirit realizes 
and comprehends itself through itself, and also enriches itself and its self-
knowledge. Then, absolute spirit is equal to the Notion that it has of itself, 
or the Notion that reflects itself by itself, and multiplies itself. As such, the 
Notion has a power to realize what it conceives. That world history devel-
ops “out of the Notion of spirit’s freedom” means absolute spirit, through 
understanding itself as freedom, leads humans to work on realizing it in the 
actual world. Through this process of realization, world history is created. 
When Habermas finds the principle of modernity in the movement of 
absolute spirit conceived by Hegel, what is at stake is not only the inces-
sant innovation articulated by this movement, but also the advancement 
of the human knowledge and spirit, and the acquisition of freedom, all of 
which should occur concomitantly. For Hegel, various manifestations of 
absolute spirit through this movement culminate in the concretizations 
of reason as the highest human faculty in social and historical reality. Cer-
tainly, Habermas does not entirely agree with Hegel’s idea of absolute spirit. 
Still, Habermas shares with Hegel the belief that the gradual actualization 
of reason corresponds to the progress of humans and the achievement of 
translation of technical terms, I replace “concept” with“notion” to translate Begriff. As for the 
translation of Geist, I replace “mind” with “spirit.” I also replace “actualization” with “realiza-
tion” for the translation of Verwirklichung. 
9. Hegel 1991, 241; translation modified with reference to hw 8: 313.
10. Hegel 1969, 618.
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freedom. Hence, Habermas’ qualification of modernity, the project of 
Enlightenment, is an eternally unfinished project that should be pursued 
endlessly towards ever-further improvement of human conditions. Look-
ing on the bright side of Habermas’ project, Bernard Stevens optimistically 
remarks that, “Modernity in the political sense is the still-incomplete effort 
to emancipate humanity from what oppresses it, including Western impe-
rialism,” and as such is “a project that… has yet to be achieved either in the 
West or in the East.”11 
This, however, is not so simple. The complexity resides in the insepara-
bility of the emancipatory aspect of modernity and its oppressive aspect 
that implicitly endorses Western imperialism. When Peter Osborne claims, 
“modernity is a Western concept, inextricably linked to the history of Euro-
pean colonialism,” he draws our attention to the inextricability of modernity 
from the socio-political conditions of its emergence. In his view, the sources 
of the time-consciousness of continual renewal are “the temporalities of 
capital accumulation and its social and political consequences,”12 generated 
against the backdrop of incessant concentration of wealth at the expense 
of the exploitation of others. As an act that propels this concentration of 
wealth, Western imperialism is a crucial factor to the formation of Western 
modernity. Western imperialist ideologies cast a shadow upon the time-con-
sciousness of Western modernity, especially upon the characteristic manner 
by which this consciousness deals with its others. The time-consciousness of 
Western modernity, which consists in differentiating itself as the “newest,” 
cannot but regard non-Western others who live elsewhere as corresponding 
to different moments in its past, simply because they are different. Osborne 
describes this operation as follows: 
The results of synchronic comparisons are ordered diachronically to produce 
a scale of development which defines “progress” in terms of the projection of 
certain people’s presents as other people’s futures, at the level of the develop-
ment of history as a whole.13 
The others of Western modernity, regarded as its pasts, are meant to arrive at 
11. Stevens 2011, 235.
12. Osborne, 1995, 13. 
13. Ibid., 17. 
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its stage in the future. Here, they are regarded as different stages of develop-
ment simply integrated into one and the same historical process—into the 
universal history whose forefront and standard are Western modernity. The 
West’s consciousness of the “backwardness” of non-Western others, attained 
in view of this alleged universal history, provides pretext for the West’s dom-
ination over them, often in the name of enlightenment and rescuing them 
from their “backwardness.” Thus, Western modernity’s time-consciousness, 
in an encounter with non-Western others, turns into a mechanism of hier-
archically subjugating them. This, in turn, lends itself to the justification of 
Western imperialism. What complicates this is that the logic that formu-
lates continual renewal and supposedly promises progress and liberation of 
all the humans at the same time contributes to legitimating certain people’s 
oppression of others, thus breaking this promise.
We can find this mechanism of subjugation already operative in Hege-
lianism, in which the first formulation of Western modernity was given. 
Hegel believed that different peoples are situated on different stages of the 
single universal history of the development of absolute spirit:
For that history is the exhibition of the divine, absolute development of 
Spirit in its highest forms—that gradation by which it attains its truth and 
consciousness of itself. The forms which these grades of progress assume are 
the characteristic “National Spirits” of World History; the peculiar tenor of 
their ethical life, of their Government, their Art, Religion, and Science.14
Hegel here asserts that the development of absolute spirit proceeds 
through stages, and the form in which this spirit appears as a human spirit 
at each stage corresponds to each national spirit. In doing so, he reduces the 
difference between various nations in the world to the degrees of variation 
in the progress of human spirit, and establishes a hierarchy among these 
nations while integrating them into the single universal history. 
Hegel’s sense of hierarchy manifests itself more bluntly when he refers to 
the concrete others of Europe. For example, he states that Africa “is no his-
torical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit.”15 
14. Hegel 1956, 53; translation modified with reference to hw 12: 73. I added the word 
“World” to the phrase, “‘National Spirits’ of History” to better reflect the original term, die 
welthistorischen Volksgeister. I also replaced “moral” with “ethical” to translate sittlich.
15. Ibid., 99. 
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Excluding certain regions or peoples from history in this way means refus-
ing them the possibility of progress, which he himself claims should reside 
in all human beings. Looking down upon them works to regard them as 
not a part of humanity proper. He also states, “Europe is absolutely the end 
of History, Asia the beginning.”16 In his view, Europe is at the forefront of 
progress, and Asia is the least advanced, or at the starting point of progress. 
Then he declares, “It is the necessary fate of Asiatic Empires to be subjected 
to Europeans.”17 Strictly speaking, Hegel sees the most advanced stage of 
human spirit in his own nation: “The German Spirit is the Spirit of the 
new World. Its aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unlimited 
self-determination of Freedom.”18 Naturally, theorizations of a hierarchy 
among different regions or peoples can easily lead toward rationalizing the 
allegedly superior should wield power over the allegedly inferior. When 
one professes certain people correspond to the most advanced stage of the 
development of absolute subject, this could mislead them into believing 
that their treatment of others who are allegedly at less advanced stages as 
mere “objects” is authorized. 
As Habermas criticizes the solipsism and dogmatism of the traditionally 
conceived rational subject, including that found in Hegelianism, one may 
expect the modernity he reformulates would be free from Eurocentrism. 
Habermas decenters the subject through his idea of communicative ratio-
nality, namely, the rationality to be realized in the communication between 
plural subjects, rather than in the self-referential monologue of the solip-
sistic or dogmatic subject. He reconceives modernity as the movement of 
such decentered subjects of communication. However, even in Habermas’ 
reformulation, the fact remains that the emancipatory aspect of modernity 
involves another oppressive aspect that implicitly endorses Western imperi-
alism. By contradicting Habermas from the perspective of Michel Foucault, 
James Tully draws our attention to the problem inherent in the common 
argument about Western modernity, which Habermas also shares, namely 
that world history is the linear progressive path of humans’ individual and 
social development. 
16. Ibid., 103. 
17. Ibid., 142. 
18. Ibid., 341. 
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These ambiguous logic-of-development arguments aim to show that individ-
ual and social evolution moves through progressive stages of development, 
the stages can be ranked hierarchically by neutral criteria, and the decentered 
worldview Habermas associates with modernity represents the highest stage. 
These kinds of developmental argument have been used since the late seven-
teenth century to try to establish the superiority and universal significance 
of European ways and they have often been employed to legitimise European 
imperialism.19
Tully’s point is that even though Habermas invokes the ideas of the 
decentered subject and worldview, insofar as such modes of subject and 
world are put at the highest stage of unilinear development, they are taken as 
the norms for this development and used to situate other modes of subject 
and world at lower stages in a hierarchy. As such, Tully insists, “Habermas’ 
theory is of the same general kind as other subject-centered philosophies.” 
In this theory, “a form of the subject… is taken for granted at the outset and 
protected from, rather than opened to criticism.”20 The subject-centeredness 
mentioned here is, paradoxically, the centeredness of the decentered subject, 
which is still based on the model of European modernity. When Habermas 
takes this subject as the ideal interlocutor of communication, he practi-
cally disqualifies other kinds of subjects from proper communication: “An 
interlocutor who questions using the decentered worldview as the standard 
against which to judge forms of reasoning that anthropologists describe in 
other cultures, for example, is characterised as an irrational relativist.”21 Nev-
ertheless, the alleged “decenteredness” of the subject guarantees its status as 
the standard, and gives this exclusion the appearance of legitimacy. What 
is going on here is not so different from Hegel’s endorsement of European 
imperialism. Here again, certain people’s dominance over others is approved 
on the pretext of the former’s alleged advancement and the latter’s alleged 
backwardness, judged according to the norm of the single subject, or at least 
the single type of subject, at the forefront of the universal history of progress. 
Looking at Hegel and Habermas through the eyes of Osborne and Tully, 
it seems that what underpins the oppressive aspect of modernity are three 
19. Tully 1999, 106. 
20. Ibid., 112. 
21. Ibid., 111. 
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elements closely associated with each other: (1) the idea of a unilinear his-
tory of progress with modernity at the forefront, which entails the hierar-
chical ordering of the degrees of this progress; (2) the centeredness of the 
single (type of ) subject as the agent or norm of this progress; and (3) the 
equation of a certain human group with the privileged personification of 
this subject, accompanied by the subordination of other peoples situated at 
lower stages of progress. Even though Habermas’ conception of modernity 
might be more sophisticated than the concept of modernity discerned in 
Hegel’s philosophy, it retains these elements and incorporates the oppressive 
aspect of modernity. Given this, when exploring ways of dealing with the ill 
effects of modernity, it is not a pointless move to return to Hegel’s philoso-
phy, in which the concept of modernity, with its double aspect, found its 
first formulation. This is especially significant regarding his ideas of absolute 
spirit and dialectic as the logic of its movement, given that they are crucial 
constituents of his concept of modernity. Keeping this in mind, this essay 
will now turn to Nishida’s criticisms of Hegel, in order to trace in them a line 
of thought that could challenge the modernity formulated by Hegelianism.
Nishida’s attack on the hegelian dialectic  
as the logic of modernity
If we look into Nishida’s later works in which he ponders history, 
the state and the world, we can discover that his criticisms of Hegelianism 
address the aforementioned three elements of the oppressive aspect of West-
ern modernity. While Nishida deals with these separately, his thought also 
connects them logically. 
In “The Problems of Japanese Culture,” published in 1940 based on his 
lectures in 1938, Nishida critically mentions the Eurocentric idea of the 
universal history of progress in which the East is situated at a less advanced 
stage compared to the West. This corresponds exactly with first element of 
the oppressive aspect of Western modernity, namely the idea of a unilinear 
history of progress with Western modernity at the forefront: 
As a consequence of the conflicts and frictions among various cultures for 
thousands of years [in Europe], a theoretical archetype [of European culture] 
was formed. [European people] regard it as the single cultural archetype. 
According to this archetype, they conceive of the stages of cultural forms and 
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situate Oriental culture at an undeveloped stage. They believe that Oriental 
culture, if it develops, should necessarily become the same as their culture. 
Even such a great thinker as Hegel had a similar thought. I think here is the 
problem.22
According to Nishida, the “theoretical archetype” of European culture, 
taken for granted by Europeans, is itself a product of history, formed at a 
certain point in time as a result of a particular course of events. He describes 
this as “conflicts and frictions among various cultures.” Nevertheless, once 
it is formed, people come to mistake such an “archetype” as the single cul-
tural archetype, which then becomes the standard according to which they 
judge other cultures as undeveloped and inferior. Hegel’s aforementioned 
idea of universal history—in which Asia is situated at the beginning, Europe 
at the end, and from which Africa is excluded—comes from the imposition 
of a similar single standard of progress upon regions other than Europe. 
This imposition allowed him to one-sidedly judge cultural others as less 
advanced. Nishida believes this mentality of assuming the single standard 
and imposing it upon others is not specific of Hegel, but common to con-
temporary Europeans. Naturally, a philosopher’s thought cannot but reflect 
the collective consciousness of his time and place, more or less. 
Furthermore, for Nishida, Hegelianism is not just one example among 
many to express this consciousness, but rather its very epitome. Along this 
line, Nishida perceives Hegelianism’s affinity with European imperialism, 
which was a dominant and accepted ideology in Europe during Hegel’s 
time. Nishida also sees overlaps between the problems of Hegelianism and 
those of the dogma that advocates European imperialism. Nishida criticizes 
Hegelianism for being complicit with this dogma based on its subject-
centered ways of thinking originating from Hegel’s concept of absolute 
spirit. In “The Problems of Japanese Culture,” he presents his opinion that, 
when “people came to think that the center of human action is in the sub-
ject” in Europe, “the imperialistic human form in the nineteenth century” 
appeared.23 He continues: 
22. nkz 12, 284. 
23. Ibid., 376. 
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Hegel’s ethical philosophy would express the morality of such a time. Behind 
the historical subject as he conceived of it was absolute spirit…. However, 
absolute spirit conceived by Hegel was still subjective [主体的], to put in my 
own terms, in the category of the grammatical subject [主語的]. It could be 
said that thinking the world to be environmentally one is the culmination 
of a way of thinking characteristic of Western culture, a way of thinking in 
which the world is taken to be subjectively one.24
In Hegel’s philosophy, since absolute spirit is the permanent subject 
of world history, there is ultimately only one world corresponding to this 
single subject that produces, cognizes, and identifies with that world, and 
thus carries history forward. Absolute spirit as this ultimate subject expands 
itself so as to swallow the whole world far beyond being the center of it. In 
this concept, Nishida sees the culmination of the subject-centered way of 
thinking, and takes this extremity of subject-centeredness as coordinated 
with “the imperialistic human form” at Hegel’s time. Thus, Nishida con-
nects the acceptance of the dogma of Western imperialism with the extrem-
ity of subject-centeredness in Hegelianism. In doing so, he makes a direct 
link between European imperialism and the idea of the centeredness of the 
single subject as the agent or norm of progress, the second element of the 
oppressive aspect of Western modernity. 
In Nishida’s view, this subject-centrism also permeates Hegel’s dialectic 
formulating the movement of absolute spirit. In the note to “The Hegelian 
Dialectic from My Standpoint,” published in 1931, Nishida draws out this 
point:
If you ask me, the Hegelian dialectic is still subjective [主語的] and noematic. 
At least, I cannot help but say that it puts stress on that direction. On the 
contrary, however, I think that true dialectic must emerge where we break 
away from such a standpoint.”25
“Noematic” is the adjective form of “noema,” which is the object or the 
objective aspect of thought. As such, this is something that can be the 
grammatical subject (主語) to be predicated in the proposition. Given 
the Hegelian dialectic characterizes the movement of absolute spirit 
24. Ibid., 376–7. 
25. Ibid., 84, n. 
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positing the object and integrating it into itself, this dialectic cannot 
but be understood with regard to the object that is grasped by absolute 
spirit. Hence, Nishida’s qualification of this dialectic as noematic, which 
he theorizes is the movement of the permanent subject (主体) of con-
sciousness grasping the object and making it the grammatical subject 
(主語) of the proposition. Whereas Hegel believes the production of reality 
consists in this noematic movement, for Nishida being noematic means not 
only falling into the category of the grammatical subject (主語的), but also 
being subjective (主観的) in the sense of depending on and solely deriving 
from the subject of consciousness. 
This noematic character has manifested itself in Hegel’s view of world 
history that results from the Notion qua absolute spirit through its dialec-
tical movement. While absolute spirit is the permanent subject (主体), the 
Notion is its objective aspect to be made into the grammatical subject of the 
proposition (主語). To the extent that the world history as Hegel conceives 
of it develops through the continual opposition and synthesis of these two 
kinds of subjects, it can also be qualified as noematic in Nishida’s sense. 
Elsewhere, in “The Problems of Japanese Culture,” Nishida further dis-
cusses the problem of the dialectic thus conceived: “There is no absolute 
negation. Insofar as the subject remains, still [this logic] consists in think-
ing from the subject.”26 Although Nishida refers merely to Hegelian logic, 
we can see the criticism he raises here as also applicable to the Hegelian 
dialectic. In fact, negation, whose lack in this logic Nishida deplores, is an 
essential constituent of the Hegelian dialectic. This dialectic is commonly 
formulated as “the negation of the negation,” in which the subject is first 
negated by the object, this subject negates the opposition between the sub-
ject and the object, and this subject finally affirms both in their synthesis. In 
this process, negation is supposed to enable subject and object to transform 
themselves so they can be synthesized beyond opposition, to create some-
thing new. However, in Nishida’s view, since absolute spirit persists through-
out the entire process of this dialectic as its permanent subject, the subject 
is not really negated. He criticizes this state of affairs as the lack of absolute 
negation. Here, the synthesis between the subject and the object, which is 
supposed to be the affirmation achieved by the negation of this negation, is 
26. Ibid., 362. 
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not truly the synthesis of the opposites. Rather, it is simply the enlargement 
of this permanent subject and enrichment of its self-knowledge through the 
integration of the object. 
If universal history is conceived of on the basis of this dialectic, it cannot 
be modeled after the self-expansion of this single permanent subject that 
does not undergo true negation. Naturally, the path of the history thus con-
ceived would be the course of linear, gradual and unceasing development 
of this subject at the expense of the subjugation of its others as “objects.” 
Viewed from this perspective, ultimately, it is the Hegelian dialectic’s lack 
of true negation as a necessary consequence of the extremity of subject-
centeredness that made Hegelianism complicit with the dogma of Euro-
pean imperialism. As a result, the Hegelian dialectic not only articulates the 
single subject’s impulse for expansion and domination over others, but also 
endorses, or even celebrates, the uninterrupted run of this impulse. 
In relation to this lack of negation resulting from the noematic nature of 
the Notion, Nishida raises another important point on the defects of the 
Hegelian dialectic in “The World as Dialectical Universal,” published in 
1934: 
Hegel’s “Notion” [概念] also did not avoid being an organic unity. Even if it 
returned to itself by its own self-negation, it still did not avoid being a univer-
sal, or, if not that, a singular individual. This is the reason why the Hegelian 
dialectic cannot be thought to be a dialectic of true absolute negation.27 
In addition to the lack of true negation in the Hegelian dialectic, Nishida 
here implies the Notion or absolute spirit, which is the single permanent 
subject of this dialectic and allegedly the most universal among all enti-
ties, is merely “a singular individual” alongside many others. Hegel asserts 
the universal, including absolute spirit, is “the ground and soil, the root and 
27. Nishida 1970, 167; translation modified to reflect nkz 7, 313. I replaced “concept” with 
“notion” to translate 概念, a Japanese word corresponding to the German Begriff. This was done 
to keep the consistency in the translation of technical terms and to show the relevance of Nishi-
da’s statement here to Hegel’s argument about Begriff. I also replaced “a singular entity” with “a 
singular individual” to translate 唯一の個物. Kobutsu (個物) is a key term in Nishida’s philoso-
phy and is usually translated as “individual.” The term “entity” obscures Nishida’s reference to 
the arguments in logic, including those of Hegel, concerning the relation among the universal, 
the particular, and the individual. 
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substance of the individual,”28 and as such “permeates all the particulars and 
embraces them within itself.”29 Therefore, for him, there is nothing wrong 
with the universal’s subsuming all individuals under it, given that they are 
included in it in the first place. However, even though Hegel qualifies it as 
absolute, for Nishida, absolute spirit is merely an individual entity far from 
being such a universal. When a particular individual is wrongly professed 
to be such a universal, it ineluctably ends up imposing its own particularity 
onto others in the name of universality. In Nishida’s view, this is what hap-
pens in the Hegelian dialectic and the world history conceived based on it. 
In a prior statement, Nishida alludes to this risk:
Even if, on the contrary, a dialectical process is conceived as an infinite 
dynamic unity, as long as a dynamic unity is conceived as spirit or as matter, 
it cannot avoid being one thing. It cannot avoid the monistic viewpoint.30 
This universalization of an individual entity named “absolute spirit” is 
not only analogous to the universalization of the archetype of European 
culture as the standard to be applicable to all cultures,31 which Nishida dis-
cerns in the collective consciousness of Europeans at Hegel’s time. Remem-
ber that Hegel in a similar vein justified the subjugation of Asia and Africa 
to Europe, while finding in Germany the most advanced realization of 
absolute spirit, and situating neighboring European countries on similarly 
advanced stages. The universalization of a single particular type of culture or 
human group in a way that justifies the subordination of others is supported 
and reinforced by the assertion that this very culture or group exclusively 
embodies absolute spirit as the most universal, par excellence. However, 
this assertion would contradict itself if the universal really were what Hegel 
describes it as, namely, “the ground and soil” that “permeates all the particu-
lars and embraces them within itself.” This means the universal invoked in 
28. Hegel 1991, 253; translation modified to reflect hw 8: 327. I changed “of the single in-
stance” with “of the individual” to translate des Einzelnen.
29. Ibid. 
30. Nishida 1970, 167; translation modified with reference to nkz 7: 312. I replaced “infi-
nitely” with “infinite” to be true to Nishida’s phrase 無限なる動的統一, because “infinite” quali-
fies “unity.”
31. Naoki Sakai, in his insight into the self-consciousness of the West, illustrates how a partic-
ular, called “the West,” universalizes itself and subjugates others as particulars (Sakai 1989, 95). 
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the above assertion is not truly universal in this sense, but itself a particular 
individual entity. That is why it can be easily projected onto another simi-
lar entity. Nishida here discloses the falsehood of the alleged universality of 
absolute spirit. In doing so, he indirectly undermines the third element of 
the oppressive aspect of Western modernity, namely the equation of a cer-
tain human group with the privileged personification of the single (type of ) 
subject as the norm or agent of human progress. 
Nishida’s criticisms of Hegelianism address the three elements of the 
oppressive aspect of Western modernity. This suggests his thought, devel-
oped around such criticisms, tends not only towards resolving the problems 
of Hegelianism, but also towards surmounting the ill effects of Western 
modernity formulated by Hegelianism. It is to this extent that we can dis-
cuss Nishida’s project to overcome modernity. As we have seen, Nishida’s 
criticisms of Hegelianism mainly target Hegel’s ideas of absolute spirit and 
the dialectic. Thus, there is an expectation that exploring Nishida’s ideas of 
the ground for all reality and of the dialectic will enable us to illuminate 
what is at stake in his project. Concretely speaking, this investigation can 
illuminate the kind of logic or worldview, alternative to those that character-
ize Western modernity, that Nishida’s project can lead to. This exploration 
and illumination will be our next task. 
Nishida’s alternative dialectic and worldview
Nishida regarded absolute nothingness as the ultimate ground for 
all beings and created his own dialectic based upon it. Although it is well 
known that his recourse to nothingness was inspired by his religious Zen 
experiences, it also has a philosophical significance. In his view, Western phi-
losophy has mainly grounded itself on Being, and developed in the center of 
it, while regarding all beings as derivative of or dependent on it. Seen from 
this viewpoint, creating a philosophy grounded in absolute nothingness can 
be an objection to the premise of Western philosophy, or at least of its domi-
nant tendency.32 As such, Nishida’s dialectic of nothingness was not merely 
32. It is worth noting that, as Heisig warns, “It is a mistake—alas, a common mistake—to 
confuse western philosophy with Nishida’s generalizations about western philosophy” (2001, 
39). 
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intended to rival the Hegelian dialectic. Still, given his critical comments on 
this dialectic, it is undeniable that one of Nishida’s motives for creating his 
own dialectic was to surmount the defects he saw in the Hegelian dialectic. 
His criticism of the Hegelian dialectic for assuming the subsistence of abso-
lute spirit can be regarded as a manifestation of his critical attitude towards 
Western philosophy’s tendency to ground itself on Being. 
The question of how Nishida conceives his own dialectic as distinguished 
from Hegel’s in order to solve its problems remains. As Nishida states “the 
true dialectical movement begins with nothingness’ becoming beings.”33 
The true dialectic for him is the process that starts from nothingness, which 
is the radical negation of all beings. In this process, nothingness, through 
the negation of itself as the most fundamental negation, creates beings and 
reaches the affirmation of beings. Nishida believes true dialectic is only pos-
sible in this way, in the literal sense of the synthesis of the opposites and 
the affirmation through the negation of negation. Here, if nothingness is the 
ground for all beings, it is only insofar as it negates itself as the ground. As 
such, it is the groundless ground, so to speak. In the process in which noth-
ingness turns into beings through self-negation, and this negation turns into 
affirmation, “the equation between nothingness and being” holds and “self-
affirmation is immediately self-negation, and self-negation is immediately 
self-affirmation.”34 This state illustrates what Nishida formulates as absolute 
contradictory self-identity. 
A brief summary of Nishida’s dialectic is enough to show he intended it 
to surmount the defects he found in Hegel’s dialectic, even though this may 
not have been the only thing at stake. First, Nishida’s dialectic, by taking 
absolute nothingness as the ground for all beings, challenges the Hegelian 
dialectic’s assumption of the subsistence of absolute spirit as the permanent 
subject and saves dialectic from subject-centeredness. Secondly, Nishida’s 
dialectic, by basing itself upon the most fundamental negation and going 
through the negation of this negation, introduces true negation, which the 
Hegelian dialectic lacks, because of its subject-centeredness. This restores to 
dialectic its dynamics to synthesize the opposites through this true negation. 
In creating his own dialectic, Nishida neither simply denies the Hegelian 
33. nkz 12: 74.
34. Ibid., 81. 
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dialectic, nor invokes nothingness out of nowhere. Rather, he inquires into 
the Hegelian dialectic’s presupposition and introduces the idea of nothing-
ness in a way that complements the deficiency of this presupposition. In 
a classical tradition of Western philosophy, which Hegel also follows, the 
essence of knowledge has been sought in the unity between the knowing 
subject and the known object. Thus conceived, knowledge is not so different 
from the subject’s self-awareness. Given the unbridgeable gap between sub-
ject and object as discrete entities, their unity, supposed that it is possible, 
would be conceivable only if the subject imposes its unity upon the object. 
Then the subject, by cognizing the object, only recognizes itself projected 
upon it. This concept of knowledge fits Hegel’s noematic dialectic that pro-
ceeds through the subject’s cognition and incorporation of the object. How-
ever, for Nishida, knowledge or even self-awareness is not possible in this 
subject-centered way: 
Against the conventional idea that self-awareness is the unity between the 
knowing and the known, I take self-awareness as seeing the self in the self…. 
The self ’s seeing the self in the above sense of self-awareness must mean the 
self ’s becoming nothingness, the self ’s becoming what determines itself 
while itself being nothingness. Insofar as the self sees itself in conformity 
with the object, in other words, insofar as it is conscious of itself, it cannot be 
said that the self is truly aware of itself. The self of which it is conscious is not 
the true self.35 
For Nishida, knowledge is not the unity between the knowing subject 
and the known object, nor is self-awareness the awareness of the same-
ness of the knowing self and the known self. Rather, if the self can know 
the object—whether it is this very self or something else—it is because the 
self has emptied itself so it can envelop the object as it is. In other words, 
both knowledge and self-awareness are possible because the self has already 
become nothingness. Only by being nothingness can the self determine 
the object as such, while at once determining oneself as the subject know-
ing it, of which the self is conscious as another object. What Nishida calls 
“the true self ” is not the subject that is itself a known object, but the noth-
ingness that underlies both this noematic subject and all its objects. To this 
35. Ibid., 66–7. 
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extent, true self-awareness is the self-awareness of nothingness; this aware-
ness undergirds the self-awareness in the usual sense, as that of the subject’s 
knowing itself as the object. Thus, self-awareness and knowledge are not 
possible in subject-centered ways through the confirmation of the subject’s 
self-sameness, nor through the imposition of the subject’s unity upon the 
object. Instead, they become possible by virtue of nothingness, which is 
absolutely different from beings, including subject and object, through its 
enveloping them and enabling their determination while negating itself in 
this determination. Here again, the dialectic of nothingness is working, 
while echoing the logic that presides over the ontological dimension in the 
epistemological: nothingness, through its self-negation, achieves the affir-
mation of beings. Hence Nishida’s following statement:
I think that what is regarded as the Hegelian dialectic can be also understood 
by putting at its beginning what I call the self-awareness of nothingness. 
What is regarded as true dialectic must genuinely signify the self-aware 
determination of nothingness.36 
For Nishida, the Hegelian dialectic, which he qualified as subjective and 
noematic, should be grounded in his dialectic of nothingness. As such, he 
sees drawing upon the latter dialectic as allowing us to correct the errors of 
the former and see things in more comprehensive ways. 
Nishida’s “The World as Dialectical Universal” discusses what kind of new 
worldview he believed would be opened from the standpoint of this dialec-
tic of nothingness. He often describes absolute nothingness as the “univer-
sal of all universals” in the sense of the most universal. In fact, as shown by 
his statement in this book, “When the universal truly negates itself, it must 
become a world of individuals,”37 he thinks that when nothingness negates 
itself and creates beings, it becomes itself a world that envelops them as 
individuals. The title, “The World as Dialectical Universal,” indicates that 
the book thematizes the world that nothingness becomes dialectically. It is 
thus reasonable to read into this work an expression of Nishida’s worldview 
based on his dialectic of nothingness, even though what is included in this 
worldview is in fact not limited to one such “world.” 
36. Ibid., 76. 
37. Nishida 1970, 167. 
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It is noteworthy that Nishida also calls this world as dialectical univer-
sal the concrete universal, using the same term Hegel used to describe the 
state, which for him is an exemplary concretization of absolute spirit as the 
most universal. This appellation suggests that Nishida’s idea of the world 
that nothingness becomes through its dialectical movement is also meant to 
present a view of the state different from Hegel’s. 
Now let us turn to how Nishida conceives such a world. He qualifies it as 
“particular” and explains the self-determination of this particular world as 
the self-determination of place. The place is that which is in itself nothing, 
and therefore that in which anything can be placed. Thus, Nishida’s equa-
tion between place and nothingness follows. Self-determination of place 
means that nothingness determines itself by becoming the world as the con-
crete universal in which things are placed, while these things recognize it 
as their own concrete place. Strictly speaking, what thus becomes is neces-
sarily plural: “The self-determination of the particular is conversely the self-
determination of place. The self-determining particular always possesses the 
other in the determination of place.”38 If the most universal is not Being, but 
nothingness, it cannot impose its own unity upon the beings it encapsulates. 
Besides, if nothingness is one, what becomes of it through self-negation 
should be multiple. Consequently, what thus becomes must be multiple con-
crete universals that are not unified by, or integrated into, the single higher 
universal. This is why the self-determination of absolute nothingness cannot 
but lead to the self-determination of the particular, insofar as the particular 
designates that which possesses other particulars and is distinguished from 
them by its genuine difference. The self-determination of absolute noth-
ingness as the most universal necessarily leads to the self-determination of 
multiple particular places, whose particularities are determined by their dif-
ferent locations. Thus, the worldview that results from Nishida’s dialectic 
of nothingness is that in which plural particular worlds, as many concrete 
universals, coexist: “In the determination of place as the self-determination 
of the dialectical universal, innumerable worlds are possible.”39 Considering 
the Hegelian equation between the concrete universal and the state, what 
Nishida presents here is the worldview in which different states, with their 
38. Ibid., 229; translation modified with reference to nkz 7: 419.
39. Ibid., 229–30; translation modified with reference to nkz 7: 419. 
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respective particularities, are affirmed as they are, freed from unification or 
integration. That nothingness allows for different worlds or states is echoed 
by each particular world’s enveloping beings as individuals, or, concretely 
speaking, each state’s comprising its members with respect for their indi-
viduality. 
In Nishida’s philosophy, this relation between different states also applies 
to different national spirits, due to the inseparability between the state and 
national spirit. He mentions this inseparability in the second appendix 
to the supplement to his Philosophical Essays vol. 4, presumably written 
between 1943 and 194540: 
When a national spirit is formed by the heroic efforts of a certain ethnic 
group at a certain point of time and place, a state is established. National 
spirit is nothing but a historical and corporeal formative force formed as the 
reciprocal determination between subject and environment. The form thus 
forming itself is the structure of the state.41
In Nishida’s view, a state is established when a human society, formed in the 
interaction between subject and environment, attains the power of self-for-
mation beyond the extent of this interaction. For this to happen, the peo-
ple living in this society must form themselves into one collective subject 
that determines itself by itself. Nishida defines national spirit as the force 
of this self-formation, the formation of the state with its own sovereignty, 
and the mentality peculiarly ascribed to these people as the result of such 
formations. Then, the relation between states resulting from the dialectic of 
nothingness is the same as the relation between the national spirits as their 
formative forces. This is why different national spirits, formed in different 
locations and characterized by respective particularities, are affirmed as they 
are. They are not hierarchically ordered according to the alleged degrees of 
40. The supplement and first appendix were written and published in 1944. The third ap-
pendix was written and mimeographed in 1943, and the second appendix was discovered later 
and added to the old version of nkz 12. For the summary of the courses in which these texts 
were written and published/mimeographed, see the afterword by Shimomura Toratarō, one of 
the editors of the older version of Nishida’s Complete Works and a member of the Kyoto School, 
nkz 12: 470–3.
41. Ibid., 420. 
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progress that correspond to the unilinear course of the gradual realization of 
absolute spirit, as is the case with Hegelianism. 
Nishida not only contrasted his own dialectic with Hegel’s, but also dif-
ferentiated his worldview based on it. If Nishida meant his dialectic to be 
more fundamental than the Hegelian dialectic, the same would be true of 
his worldview resulting from this dialectic. The message implied in this 
worldview would be that, even if a certain group of people or states rule 
over others in the status quo, the state of affairs in which the diversity of 
states or nations is respected without unification or hierarchization, or in 
which many different worlds coexist, is more fundamental. This is true to 
the authentic reality of the absolute ground for all beings. 
The collapse of nishida’s project  
to overcome modernity
In presenting alternatives to the Hegelian dialectic as the logic 
of modernity and the Hegelian worldview that endorse Western imperial-
ism, Nishida’s philosophy seems to tackle the first and second elements of 
the oppressive aspect of modernity, namely the hierarchical ordering of dif-
ferent states allegedly corresponding to the degrees of progress in unlinear 
universal history, and the centeredness of the single subject as the agent or 
norm of this progress. However, with regard to the third element, that is, 
the equation of a certain human group with the privileged personification 
of such a subject, Nishida’s stance is ambiguous, or indeed, problematic. 
One may question whether it is possible that Nishida still equated certain 
people with the personification of such a subject, despite being so opposed 
to Hegel’s assumption of the absolute spirit as the single permanent subject 
of a universal history of progress. Strictly speaking, the problem is precisely 
that Nishida equated a certain group of people with the privileged personi-
fication of absolute nothingness. In doing so, he did not only substantialize 
and subjectify nothingness, but also introduced a hierarchical ordering of 
diverse states that, while differently conceived than Hegel’s, worked against 
Nishida’s supposed goal of eliminating such hierarchies. Here, Nishida is 
unfaithful to his own criticisms of Hegelianism. 
In “The Problems of Japanese Culture,” Nishida sees the particularity of 
Japanese culture in the attitude of “thoroughly negating oneself and becom-
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ing the thing,” or “emptying oneself and seeing a thing, immersing oneself in 
the thing.” He equates this attitude with the quintessence of Japanese spirit: 
“The quintessence of Japanese spirit must consist in being united into the 
thing or matter. To do so means to become one where there was neither the 
self, nor someone else in the first place.”42 In thus discerning the quintes-
sence of Japanese spirit in the attitude of negating and emptying oneself, 
Nishida practically claims that Japanese spirit embodies absolute nothing-
ness par excellence. This claim does not seem not so different from Hegel’s 
idea that the national spirit of Germany is the highest realization of absolute 
spirit.
Although Nishida argues that Oriental culture in general has a tendency 
in which “the subject negates itself and becomes environmental, becomes 
the thing,”43 he asserts that two major Oriental cultures—Chinese and 
Indian—“lacked the spirit of going towards truth to the end, and therefore 
were stiffened and fixed.”44 Japanese spirit, he states, pursued this direc-
tion to the end. Nishida here simplistically reduces the difference between 
national spirits to the difference in the degrees to which they embody noth-
ingness. Nishida once criticized Hegel and his contemporaries for setting 
up the single archetype of European culture as the standard to judge other 
cultures as undeveloped and inferior. Yet, Nishida here does the same thing, 
judging other cultures according to the archetype he invented based on the 
model of Japanese culture. 
Nishida’s advocacy of Japanese spirit is not merely a matter of genuinely 
encouraging the morality of self-negation or annihilation. Given the insepa-
rability between the state and national spirit as its formative force, promot-
ing the value of Japanese spirit is promoting the value of the Japanese state, 
or indeed its structure that makes it as such—that is, the form formed by 
this spirit, as attested by Nishida’s following statement in the appendix to 
“The Problems of Japanese Culture”: 
Today we should not only be proud of the particularity of the structure 
of our state, but also have an eye to the global profundity of this structure 
42. Ibid., 346. 
43. Ibid., 345. 
44. Ibid., 280. 
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and illuminate it, and then promulgate it in the world in both theory and 
practice.
Later, he writes: “Then, consequently, a new world order will be constituted 
based on this form.”45 This passage makes it obvious that Nishida recom-
mends the promulgation of the structure of the Japanese state, which entails 
constructing a world order based on this structure. While it is not stated 
outright, doing so ostensibly requires this state to gain global hegemony 
strong enough to make this happen.
If we leave aside this claim’s affinity with wartime expansionist propa-
ganda, for which some scholars argue Nishida was forced to express his 
support, what remains problematic is his assertion that a certain nation—
indeed, his own—personifies the absolute ground for all beings par excel-
lence.46 This assertion permits him to situate Japan at the most advanced 
stage of the embodiment of nothingness and make it the privileged agent 
and norm of this embodiment, which other states, one-sidedly judged as 
less advanced, should follow or model themselves after. Consequently, this 
assertion ruins the worldview he presented based on the dialectic of noth-
ingness—the worldview in which different states coexist with their diversity 
affirmed, freed from unification and hierarchization. Moreover, by granting 
Japan the status of this privileged agent and norm, this assertion permits not 
only strong subjectivity to be attributed to Japan, but also substantializes 
and subjectifies nothingness. If a single state that embodies nothingness par 
excellence is granted strong subjectivity, the nothingness thus embodied is 
not really nothingness, but the single incomparable absolute subject, com-
parable to absolute spirit. 
Concerning Japan’s subjectivity, Nishida’s following statement is fre-
quently invoked as attesting to his refusal to make Japan a subject: “What 
we should above all caution ourselves against is making Japan a subject.” 
Strangely enough, another statement made shortly after this tends to be dis-
regarded: “That we demonstrate the principle of world formation lying at 
the basis of our [ Japanese] history does not mean that Japan stops being a 
45. Ibid., 410–11. 
46. Curiously enough, this assertion is largely accepted as a decent formulation of “Japanese 
cultural uniqueness,” even today. 
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historical subject.”47 That is to say, if Japan is to demonstrate the dialectic 
of nothingness that has cultivated Japanese spirit in Japanese history, Japan 
need not stop being a subject. Nishida’s claim expressed by these two seem-
ingly opposite statements is that Japan can be a subject insofar as it negates 
itself as a self-centered subject, and realizes the morality of self-annihilation 
grounded in absolute nothingness. Some scholars may read this claim as 
Nishida’s secret resistance to the wartime regime, remonstrating against its 
egoistic military expansionism. However, combined with his prior claim 
that Japanese spirit embodies nothingness par excellence, more likely this 
claim implies that Japan has realized this morality of annihilation in its his-
tory, is an essentially moral state, and therefore is already worthy of subjec-
tivity. Whether Nishida supported the wartime regime from the bottom of 
his heart or not, this dogmatic conviction of the superiority of one’s own 
state and its subjectivity was a basic tenet of wartime ideologies. Besides, 
one trick of such ideologies was to use moral ideals to embellish and jus-
tify brutal acts of colonial aggression. Nishida’s assumption of the essential 
morality of his own state and assertion of its selfless subjectivity would never 
remonstrate against such acts, but rather practically justify them under the 
banner of the moral state and its selfless subjectivity. 
Nishida, in view of surmounting the defects of Hegelianism, presented 
alternative ideas of the ultimate ground for reality, the dialectic and the 
world. In doing so, he undercut the centeredness of the single absolute 
subject, equated by Hegel with such a ground, and the hierarchical order-
ing of states, modeled after the unilinear course of this subject’s dialectical 
movement. However, Nishida equated his own state with the privileged 
personification of the alternative ground for reality. In doing so, he allowed 
room for making this ground another single absolute subject and reintro-
ducing another hierarchical ordering of states in the name of this subject. 
As Nishida gave new life to the third element of the oppressive aspect of 
modernity—the equation of a certain group with the privileged personifi-
cation of the subject—he essentially nullified the positive outcomes of his 
efforts to tackle the first and second elements. Thus, the project of overcom-
ing Western modernity discerned in Nishida’s philosophy collapses because 
47. Ibid.,341. 
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of its own inconsistency. It fails to be true to itself and interrupts the very 
lines of thought it pursues. 
Hegel’s and Nishida’s philosophies provide a comparative case in which 
the professed emancipatory potential of a philosophy is undermined by 
the philosopher’s ethnocentric assumptions. When some scholars noncha-
lantly celebrate Nishida’s philosophy as heralding an alternative modernity, 
surpassing modernity, or even postmodernity, the ethnocentric pitfall into 
which his philosophy fell is largely ignored. However, given that Nishida’s 
fallacy ruined any positive outcomes of his project of overcoming moder-
nity, we need to take this failure seriously and make efforts to search for 
ways to tackle this problem, rather than disregard it and highlight only the 
bright side of things. Otherwise, we risk repeating the same mistakes, pos-
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